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Dialectics and the Measure of the World 
 
Stuart Elden1 
Department of Geography, Durham University, South Road, Durham 
 
 
Post-structuralist Dialectics?  
This is an intriguing set of papers, and they open up a range of issues concerning the 
contemporary, geographical, understanding of dialectics. In many ways the terrain on which 
they operate is the ground between Marxism and post-structuralism. Eric Sheppard, for 
instance, suggests that radical geography was Marxist inflected, but that critical geography 
has been influenced by post-structuralism and feminism. The question that remains is to 
what extent the former has been eclipsed, lost, in the transition to the former. One of the 
ways in which post-structuralism has criticised Marxism, as these papers illustrate, concerns 
the question of the dialectic. This is not the only object of critique, certainly, but many post-
structuralist accounts have taken issue with the supposedly linear, teleological and 
ageographical aspects of the classical dialectic.2 
 
These papers take a rather different approach. Although they do not agree on everything, 
some key themes can be pointed to. Rather than try to offer a post-structuralism without the 
                                                 
1 stuart.elden@durham.ac.uk 
2  For a discussion of dialectics in their more theoretical sense, in relation to Lefebvre, see 
Elden 2004, especially Chapter One. For a broader discussion, see Rose 1984. 
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dialectic, they instead try to illustrate how many so-called post-structuralist thinkers have a 
profoundly ambivalent relation to the dialectic: one that is not uncritical, but nor one that 
evidences a wholesale rejection. For Sheppard, when faced with post-structuralist critiques of 
dialectics, the response is to offer the Hegelian dialectic up as a sacrifice in order to retain 
and maintain something other in the dialectic, which for him is a geographical resonance, 
that can bear fruitful comparison with Deleuze and Guattari. Chris Collinge‘s essay, 
―Positions Without Negations?‖ operates within the domain opened up by Lefebvre and 
Harvey‘s introduction of Hegelian and Marxist ideas, which he thinks through in relation to 
scale. Collinge suggests that Derrida‘s work on contingency can be helpful in broadening the 
reach of the dialectic, since it indicates ―a conflict of forces rather than a contradiction of 
meanings, a conflict that does not lead towards teleological completion but towards a 
deferral of completion in the endless displacement from one term to the next‖ (2008: 5). 
This is illustrated by thinking through Neil Smith‘s Uneven Development (1984). Gidwani offers 
a rather different account, but he too wants to expose the problems of the Hegelian dialectic 
in order to pursue more progressive political and theoretical aims. His immanent reading and 
critique of Hegel is designed to show what other possibilities lie obscured in his thought but 
also what political problems are at stake. He does this through an engagement with Frantz 
Fanon, whom he describes as ―an acute and disloyal reader‖ of Hegel (Gidwani 2008: 1, 7). 
The fulcrum is a reading of the famous master-slave or ‗lord-bondsman‘ dialectic in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
 
While Gidwani‘s reading shows a particular fidelity to his texts, not all of the contributions 
operate in that register. Sheppard explicitly wants to ―provocatively identify and make space 
for alternative readings‖, which he identifies—perhaps anticipating critical responses—as ―a 
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smash-and-grab philosophy‖ (Sheppard 2008: 4). Drawing on Bhaskar‘s Dialectic: The Pulse of 
Freedom (1993) he shows how the dialectic exceeds and includes Hegel, often wrongly 
identified as the privileged site of dialectical thought, and unfairly characterized as 
―thesis/antithesis/synthesis‖ (as he is here, in passing – Sheppard 2008: 5).3 There are a 
number of issues in this presentation, but mindful of the ‗smash-and-grab‘ defence, I will 
note only one. This is the use of Roy Bhaskar as the interpretative schema for dialectical 
thought. While this is indeed a remarkable book, one of the notable things about it is that 
Bhaskar is trying to reconcile a Marxist dialectical approach with his own thought, thus 
arguing that dialectical relations are themselves real, rather than simply objects of thought. 
The critique of Hegel on the dialectic is as much for its idealism as its construction and 
teleology, something that is acknowledged in part (Sheppard 2008: 9). But this goes beyond 
Marx‘s own materialist critique, and bears on Bhasker‘s own critical realism. We should 
never forget that short-cuts do not just get us from A to B quicker, but they take us through 
different terrain en route. 
 
Sheppard‘s commentary though does have the important merit of trying to open up the 
ground upon which some of geography‘s less-than-edifying recent debates have taken place. 
He refers to the ‗What‘s Left‘ spat which begun in the pages of Antipode, and the ‗scale vs. 
flat ontology‘ discussions in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.  Sheppard‘s 
attempt to show that the different positions in these debates actually share some barely-
acknowledged commonalities is helpful, and his attempt to show how ―dialectics and post-
structuralism can be mutually constitutive‖ (Sheppard 2008: 12) is genuinely illuminating. 
                                                 
3  Ruddick‘s distance from this reading is more appropriate (2008: 3-4). 
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The tensions between the two need to be worked through rather than set up as opposed: a 
dialectical way of thinking and working through difference. Ruddick‘s intention is remarkably 
similar, cautioning that geographical thought should not try to institute simple opposites, and 
instead recognise points of convergence alongside divergence. This is what she calls ―a 
dialectics of the positive – understanding their encounter, not as the negative of each other, 
but reading each in terms of their own adequate truth‖ (Ruddick 2008: 1). 
 
Many of the other papers operate within this remit. Anna Secor, for instance, in ―Žižek‘s 
Dialectics of Difference and the Problem of Space‖, tries to show how Žižek provides the 
possibility of ―an open dialectic without synthesis or totality‖ (Secor 2008: 1). Her focus is 
on the notion of ‗the parallax view‘ (Žižek 2006) where conflicting views on things do not 
need to be reconciled, adjudicated between, or disproved, but can all be correct at the same 
time if we see them from different perspectives. To take an example of this in Žižek, albeit 
one not cited by Secor herself: 
 
―The three ‗true‘ reasons for the attack on Iraq (ideological belief in Western 
democracy – Bush‘s ‗democracy is God‘s gift to humanity‘; the assertion of 
US hegemony in the new world order; economic interests – oil) should be 
treated like a ‗parallax‘: it is not that one is the ‗truth‘ of the others; the ‗truth‘ 
is, rather, the very shift of perspective between them2 (Žižek 2004: 6). 
 
Once again Deleuze is a stage along the way to allow the possibility of Žižek‘s insights to 
come through, a productive tension that Secor calls a ―dance‖ (Secor 2008: 2), but which is 
more easily reconciled when we realize that it is Žižek‘s Deleuze—that is an already more 
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amenable figure—that is at stake here (Secor 2008: 3; see Žižek 2003). Žižek, we are told, 
offers ―a dialectics that employs no binary logic; there is no ―Other‖ of the One, only a 
multitude of attempts to fill in for the lack of the Other. It eschews the notion of a mediated 
unity, a synthetic whole or All‖ (Secor 2008: 6). 
 
Secor uses this to contest David Harvey‘s account of the war in Iraq as illustrating the 
tensions between the logics of capital and territory (2003), a conceptual move he makes 
building upon Giovanni Arrighi (1994). For Harvey there are two contrasting elements 
within capitalist imperialism: on the one hand its basis in state politics and on the other the 
flow of capital between and beyond such strict territorial boundaries. Capital usually operates 
beyond territorial strategies. While usually this is without explicit conflict, at times the logic 
of capital dictates a territorial violation. For Secor, following Žižek, ―the war itself arises as 
the symptom of the ways in which the imperatives of neoliberal globalization are 
irreconcilable with the territorial and military mandate of the imperial state… The war on 
Iraq has not married territorial and economic logics; rather, it serves to paper over their 
complete lack of relation‖ (Secor 2008: 8). This attempt to stress the ―between/within‖ of 
the parallax gap is conceptually interesting, but politically disabling. How does recognition of 
this irreconcilability enable a response? What, beyond a mere statement of the issue, are we 
to make of this? The terrible political problems of Žižek‘s recent book In Defence of Lost 
Causes (2008b) seem to be a symptom of this malaise (see also 2008a). 
 
Marcus Doel‘s ―Dialectics Revisited: Reality Discharged‖ works in a similar register to 
Secor‘s, and similarly operates within the domain Sheppard sought to open up. It uses 
Derridean deconstruction and post-structuralism more generally to rethink the notion of 
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reality, or the Real. It advances the challenging idea that reality may actually be discharged – 
that is, without fundamental or essential polarization, agonism or conflict. Rather than 
having positive or negative charge, Doel asks what would happen if we thought it ―in terms 
of blankness? What if the Real were Earthed?‖ (Doel 2008: 4). Indeed his conclusion is that 
―the Open is bereft of charge, and for that very reason, dialectics has no purchase 
whatsoever on the Real‖ (Doel 2008: 19). These provocations are somewhat eclipsed by the 
mode of expression at play here, with allusion and illusion—the magician‘s rabbits—giving 
way to comments on formal dialectical logic. What is intriguing here is that the readings on 
dialectics are not through reference to Hegel or Marx, or even to Marxist commentators, but 
to writers such as Derrida and Lyotard whose conclusions allow Doel to pursue his claim 
that 
 
―The Real is Open: nothing more, nothing less. Hereinafter, it will be 
necessary for geographers to content themselves with an Open Reality bereft 
of charge. Space takes place, and neither the plus nor the minus have any 
purchase on any situation whatsoever‖ (Doel 2008: 19). 
 
Dialectics as ‘Baggy Clothes’ 
Doel earlier cites Deleuze on dialectics to reinforce this point. In the book Bergsonism, 
Deleuze suggests that too much abstract thought works with concepts that ―like baggy 
clothes, are much too big‖ (1991: 44; see Doel 2008: 14). This, Doel tells us, is ―why Deleuze 
will have no truck with the dialectic‖ (2008: 14). ―The combination of opposites tells us 
nothing: it forms a net so slack that everything slips through‖ (Deleuze 1991: 44–45). Henri 
Bergson himself had argued that dialectics do not deal with the world as it is, in all its 
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complexity. He suggested that they are ―too large… not tailored to the measurements of the 
reality in which we live‖ (1963: 1/1254; cited in Mackay 2007: 7). While this certainly appears 
like a rejection of dialectical thinking in its entirety, thinking through the nature of the 
objection is illuminating. While still problematic, Deleuze‘s complaint is certainly a more 
useful formulation than the suggestion that ‗eagles don‘t catch flies‘‖ (see Woodward et. al. 
2007). It is useful because it opens up the question of what precisely it is that dialectics are 
supposedly inadequate to, what they fail to grasp. 
 
The question it opens up is whether there is an issue of scale: dialectics is too big, and the 
world more complicated and shot through with detail and particularity. This is what Bergson 
seems to be invoking with the notion of tailoring our concepts to ―measurements of the 
reality in which we live‖. Yet it is not at all clear that Deleuze or Bergson would be content 
with what might be called a micro-dialectics, operating with finer particles. There are flaws 
with the process as much as the design. But shared both by dialectics and this critique are a 
number of assumptions. Three key issues or questions arise from this. 
 
1. The first is the question of how well dialectics enable us to deal with the world – as it is, 
in its complexity, with its measurements, in its reality. 
2. But we should also ask whether this is something we actually want – do we know how 
the world is, its reality; and is its complexity something we want to measure? 
3. Or, alternatively, can this work help us to understand the problems of a static, 
measurable world, one that can be reduced to the claim that it is fundamentally 
knowable? This raises some important questions about the nature of measure more 
generally. 
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The relation of dialectics to the world is perhaps most fully worked through in Engels‘ book 
Dialectics of Nature (1940). Yet this book, which was one of the key inspirations for the 
dialectical materialism, or ‗diamat,‘ of the officially sanctioned philosophy of Marxist-
Leninism, diverges from Marx himself. It is important to remember that Marx never actually 
used the words ‗dialectical materialism‘, nor did he follow up the plan he outlined to Engels 
of writing ―two or three printer‘s sheets [of about 16 pages each]‖ on the dialectical 
methodology (Marx and Engels 1983: 249). Lenin remarks in his Philosophical Notebooks that 
Marx may not have left us with a Logic of his own, on the model of Hegel, but he did leave 
the logic of Capital (1963: 361). While later versions of ‗Marxism‘ supplemented it with extra 
elements--Engels, Lenin, Kautsky and others--the issue is whether they were developments 
within its system or changes to it.  
 
The question of materiality is another key concern here. Materiality and the new geographies 
of it has received a good deal of attention recently (see, for example, Anderson and Tolia 
Kelly eds. 2004). This is a materiality that goes beyond mere materialism, or, at least, crude 
mechanism. Lefebvre once remarked that a Marxist dialectician would prefer an ―intelligent 
idealism‖ to a ―stupid materialism‖ (1960: 17), which remains sound advice. Nonetheless the 
way that materiality matters to dialectics was not always clear in these papers. For although 
Marx did not use the term ‗dialectical materialism‘, he did advocate a historical materialism. 
For David Harvey and others the aim of a Marxist geography has been to introduce another 
term into this, producing a ‗historical-and-geographical materialism‘ – or, perhaps better than 
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‗producing‘, making obvious what was previously neglected.4 Yet while Harvey remains 
attentive to the relation between history and geography, demonstrating the benefits of this, 
for example, in his A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), others do not always follow this 
lead.5 The question of history and, in particular, the history of ideas, seems to me to be one 
of the key issues in theoretical work in geography today, perhaps even more when historical 
materialist—dialectical or not—accounts are offered. 
 
One of the crucial questions that follows from all this is whether dialectics is a way of 
understanding nature and the material world, or whether we think that the world operates 
dialectically in itself, and that this is why dialectics enables an understanding. It is this 
question that I want to pursue here, by looking at two nondialectical materialist thinkers, the 
French philosophers Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux. Thinking through their work 
explicitly confronts the question of mathematics and that of the world. 
 
The Return of Mathematics: A Rejection of Dialectics? 
It seems notable that mathematics and its relation to philosophy is making something of a 
return in human geography, and yet not as a straight-forward rerun of the quantitative 
revolution. Some of this is in terms of an interrogation of the wider issues of calculation – 
the geography of mathematics, rather than the mathematics of geography (see, for example, 
                                                 
4  The classic text for this is Harvey 1982. 
5  Another successful proponent of this approach would be Neil Smith, in 2005, and, 
especially, 2003. 
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the special issues of key geography journals: Philo ed. 1998; Barnes and Hannah eds. 2001a, 
2001b; Crampton and Elden eds. 2006).  
 
Yet there is also something rather different happening. Sheppard notes that, 
―notwithstanding tendencies among ‗critical‘ human geographers to dismiss quantitative 
approaches as tainted by positivism and neoclassical economics, the domains of mathematics 
associated with nonlinear and complex systems have turned out to be pertinent for 
dialectical, postmodern and assemblage ontologies‖ (Sheppard 2008: 14; see Bergmann, 
Sheppard, and Plummer, forthcoming). Martin Jones‘ important work on ―phase space‖ 
(2009), working through insights in Henri Poincaré, is another symptom of this engagement. 
In her paper Susan Ruddick raises the issue of the relation between mathematics and 
metaphysics, two modes of though she claims that seventeenth century natural philosophy 
did not strictly distinguish (2008: 9). She illustrates this through a careful reading of Spinoza 
against Hegel‘s (mis)interpretation, inspired by Pierre Macherey‘s Hegel ou Spinoza (Ruddick 
2008; Macherey 1977). Spinoza‘s two non-concentric circles are given as a model of ―how 
the infinite expresses itself fully in the finite as a positivity‖ (Ruddick 2008: 8). 
 
While Barbara Hooper‘s paper operates in a rather different register, with its careful 
excavation of the Greek heritage of dialectics, it too invokes the question of mathematics. In 
this case it raises the important issue of the relation of mathematics to bodies. She cites 
Jacob Klein‘s important work, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, noting that 
―we first acquire the ‗art of number‘(arithmetike) in our ‗intercourse with objects of daily life‘‖ 
(Klein 1992: 18; Hooper 2008: 14). She goes on to suggest that number is a ―form of 
‗ontological mathematics‘‖ (Hooper 2008: 14). This is close to Badiou‘s claim that ontology 
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is mathematics: a question that needs to be interrogated textually, politically and theoretically. 
Indeed I would suggest that the growing interest in Badiou within human geography is 
perhaps the most significant example of this mathematical trend. While Badiou was only 
mentioned briefly by Doel and Ruddick in this collection of papers (Doel 2008: 18, 19; 
Ruddick 2008: 1, 2), he is beginning to receive attention within geography more widely (see 
Dewsbury 2007; Saldanha 2007; Doel 2009).6 
 
The interest in these issues, and in Badiou in particular, invites questions of the capacity, 
complexity and complicity of mathematics. What can mathematics do, and in particular what 
does this embrace of number, calculation, geometry and other branches of mathematics, 
such as set theory, allow us to do that we could not otherwise? How does this actually sit in 
terms of the appropriation of complex thinkers? And, most troublingly, what does this 
embrace of Badiou buy into, and are we aware of and willing to accept its associations?  
 
The reason for there being some caution concerning the appropriation of Badiou is, in part, 
because of a particular way in which he is being read. This goes back to the question of easy 
appropriation and eliding of differences. This can either be through a cursory use of the 
theoretical works, or a utilisation of the more explicitly political works, such as Polemics 
(2006c) or The Century (2007) without relating them to their essential context in the 
arguments of his more theoretical works. Badiou‘s major work L’être et l’événement (1988) is 
                                                 
6  A forthcoming issue of Environment and Planning D: Society and Space contains a theme 
section on Badiou‘s work, including ―Being and Spatialization: An interview with 
Alain Badiou by Marios Constantinou and Norman Madarasz‖. 
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one of the most formidably difficult texts of recent times, one that bears comparison of 
complexity with works of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger. The recent English translation Being 
and Event (2005a) confirmed impressions that it was a matter of difficulty of content rather 
than of expression. Its second volume, Logiques du monde (2006a), develops and complicates 
many of its claims. Let us be cautious about it and not make hasty use of his work.  
 
The interest in Badiou by theoretically minded geographers seems to me to be problematic 
for a number of reasons, but not least because what Badiou says seems to unravel many of 
the more carefully won victories of a rigorous, theoretically informed geography that does 
not aspire to be a spatial (or social) science. In particular, Badiou‘s use of mathematics opens 
up a number of tensions with thinkers such as Heidegger and Foucault, for instance, who are 
critical of the ways in which calculation dominates the modern epoch.7 Badiou‘s mathematics 
is, of course, a very different form of mathematics, based on set theory, but it still pushes 
philosophy into a subordinate position. Badiou declares that if ―we abstract all presentative 
predicates little by little, we are left with the multiple, pure and simple… being-as-being, 
being as pure multiplicity – can be thought only through mathematics‖ (2001: 127). 
 
Thus philosophy, for Badiou, must humble itself ―before mathematics by acknowledging 
that mathematics is in effect the thinking of pure being, of being qua being‖ (1998: 38). If it 
does this, then ―philosophy unburdens itself of what appears to be its highest responsibility: 
it asserts that it is not up to it to think being qua being‖ (1998: 55). Geographers have 
                                                 
7  I‘ve tried to work through some problems in terms of Badiou and his engagement 
with Heidegger in the final pages of my book Speaking Against Number (Elden 2006).  
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struggled for a long time against the scientific pretensions of parts of the discipline, and so it 
would be particularly ironic if the ‗new theory‘ brought this back at an even more 
fundamental level. Set theory is, even in complex forms, difficult to reconcile with the range 
of theoretical interests of contemporary geography. For Badiou expressly sees his project as 
concerning the relation between nature and number and, therefore, in part as a development 
and extension of Galileo‘s claim that nature is written in ―mathematical language‖ (2005a: 
140). He is avowedly Cartesian, even as he posits a post-metaphysical ―speculative 
materialism‖. In addition, it is difficult to reconcile his work with any meaningful account of 
dialectics. When he talks about the dialectic at all, it is in a form that seems wilfully distorted. 
Badiou claims, for instance,  that a ―materialist dialectic‖ should be opposed to what he calls 
―democratic materialism‖. Democratic materialism suggests that ―there are only bodies and 
languages‖; to which materialist dialectics replies that ―there are only bodies and languages, 
except that there are truths‖ (2006a: 9, 12). For Badiou, the dialectic is the syntax or logic of 
the only/except, or more fully: ―there are only… except that there are [Il n’y a que… sinon 
qu’il il y a]‖. He claims that ―this syntax indicates that it is a matter neither of an addition 
(truths as simple supplements of bodies and languages), nor of a synthesis (truths as the self-
revelation of bodies grasped by languages). Truths exist as exceptions to what there is‖ 
(2006a: 12). In Logiques du monde, this is used as a basis for an incorporation of Descartes into 
his overall project, which he ties to the project of Being and Event which outlined an embrace 
of truths as ―generic multiplicities‖ (2006a: 15).8 Dialectics quickly becomes didactics (2006a: 
17). 
 
                                                 
8
  Most of the opening pages of this book appear in English as 2006e. See also 2005b. 
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We can see the consequences of this mathematicisation of truth and existence perhaps 
particularly clearly in the work of Badiou‘s former student Quentin Meillassoux. In his recent 
book Après la finitude, prefaced and endorsed by Badiou, Meillasoux argues for a dismissal of 
a belief in ‗correlationism‘ (2006: 18). Correlationism is described as the thesis that things we 
observe are dependent on the observer in some fundamental ways, or more fundamentally, 
that humans and the world coexist. There is a necessary correlation between what is 
observed and that which observes. Subjectivity and objectivity cannot be thought 
independently (2006: 18-19). One way in which this is stated is Heidegger‘s notion of being-
in-the-world. Not a world that first exists, and then has beings in it; nor a being who exists 
and then exists in the world; but an essential interrelation between them. Correlationism 
does not deny an absolute reality, but recognises that it is always mediated for us through the 
perception of it. This a model of knowledge that can be traced back to Kant, and then 
permeates the continental European tradition which produces so many of the thinkers 
geographers have found so influential. More broadly it underpins attempts to recognise a 
human element in a material ontology. The contemporary critique of representation within 
geography can be understood as part of this movement of thought. Correlationism is neither 
an atheism or a religious perspective, but an agnostic one: the only world that exists for us is 
the world as it is known to us. It thus differs from the ‗Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian-
Darwinian‘ view that science can tell us about the world as it actually is (see Milbank 2007). 
 
Meillassoux takes one particular example to challenge the problems of this way of thinking. 
These are what he calls arche-fossils, radioactive traces of what can be proven to have 
existed before there was anything that would have perceived that existence. The universe is 
13.5 billion years old; the earth 4.45 billion; life on earth 3.5 billion; human origins a mere 2 
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million (2006: 24). While philosophers have claimed that this is ―an unexpected new 
battlefield for continental thought‖ (Harman 2007: 104), in a sense this is a geologic or 
physical geographical challenge to human geography. There is a world of which we can have 
objective knowledge without their being any mediation between the knowledge and the 
observer, except at a several million year interval. While the explicit dating is meditated, the 
existence of these phenomena is not. Meillassoux is unimpressed with the response that 
there are many things that are unperceived that we still accept exist. For him this is a much 
more fundamental challenge than one that can be dismissed by the argument that 
manifestation always has absences or lacunae; rather these are things completely exterior to 
the range of manifestation. It is thus not a question of the finitude of perception, that is, its 
intrinsic limitations, but a problem prior to the advent of perception. As Brassier puts it, it is 
not therefore ―merely a non-manifest gap or lacuna in manifestation; it is the lacuna of 
manifestation tout court‖ (2007: 25). Meillassoux suggests that correlationism, in all its 
variants, is a convenient way of avoiding having to account for the world as it is, prior to 
human access. In response it is tempting here to recall Heidegger‘s riposte to Kant. Kant 
thought it a failure that we could not account for the existence of things outside of us 
without falling back on our own existence [Dasein]. Heidegger thought this distinction 
needed to be collapsed. The ‗scandal of philosophy‘ is not that there has been a failure to 
provide a proof for the existence of the external world, but rather ―that such proofs are expected 
and attempted again and again‖ (1962: 205). 
 
Meillassoux closes his book with the thought that while Kant may have been awoken from 
his ‗dogmatic slumbers‘ by reading Hume, perhaps today we need to be shaken from our 
straight-forward rendering of the world and its relation to the human, which he calls ―our 
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correlationist slumbers‖ (2006: 178). Meillassoux, following Badiou, claims that mathematics 
describes the world as it was, in what he calls the ancestral sphere or realm, and as it is (2006: 
16, 37, 158 and passim).9 Mathematics then is not a way of describing the world as it appears 
to us, but a mode of access to the world in itself. This is a mode of relation to the absolute, 
―reality in itself apart from any relation to humans‖ (Harman 2007: 104). This trajectory of 
thought is, therefore, a thorough going critique of the critique of representation. 
Meillassoux‘s claim is simply stated: ―… everything concerning the object that can be 
formulated in mathematical terms can be rightly conceived as properties of the object in 
itself‖ (2006: 16). He takes the set theory elaborated by Badiou and the analysis of 
probability of Vernes (1982) to begin to describe this (2006: 130-1; see also Meillassoux 
2004). He suggests that this means that there is now a certainty that there is no causal 
necessity. Whereas previous claims have simply been sceptical about this, now this can be 
stated absolutely. While apparently contradictory, the only thing that is necessary is that there 
is no necessity; hence his claim that contingency is necessary. Thus the title of his book – 
After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. As Badiou puts it, Meillassoux 
―establishes that only a sole thing is absolutely necessary: that the laws of nature are 
contingent‖ (2006b: 10). That contingency can be analysed mathematically. As Harman puts 
it: ―the essential criteria of all mathematical statements will be transformed into necessary 
conditions of the contingency of every being‖ (2007: 108). 
                                                 
9  As Harman notes, ―the ancestral realm in his work still functions solely as a 
mechanism for absolutizing the correlational circle: indeed, his method of obtaining 
the absolute arises directly from a radicalization of the correlational predicament 
itself‖ (2007: 116). 
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While the charge is powerful and the case he makes for their being a problem compelling, 
the consequences of his solution would, in their mathematical bias, unravel much of what 
passes for theorizing in contemporary human geography. Badiou sees Meillassoux‘s work as 
an entirely complicit development of his work, even as he accords it a stature and 
importance of its own (see 2006b; and particularly 2006a: 129, 589; 2006d: 17). Taking on 
Badiou may force some uncomfortable liaisons. Meillassoux himself has noted that a reader 
can agree with the critique of correlationism without having to accept his own solution.10 It 
would be possible, for instance, to have grave doubts about the claim that knowledge is 
always filtered through human experience without thinking that mathematics escapes that 
mediation.11 But it is the solution, rather than simply the critique, that Badiou endorses. 
Those invoking the name of Badiou need to be clear about whether they embrace the 
mathematical aspects of his work, or whether they contest them. If the latter, then the onus 
is on them to show how the politics or whatever else they find worthwhile can be separated 
from the ontology. This is not a move that Badiou would willingly concede, and his own 
writings, along with those of Meillassoux, illustrate the very real challenges this provides. We 
should not assume that quite different thinkers can be reconciled without very real problems, 
tensions and negotiations. 
 
                                                 
10  Meillassoux, email to Graham Harman, 9 June 2006, cited in Harman 2007: 117 n. 4.  
11  For a more fully worked through critique, which takes issue both with the 
interpretation of Kant and the consequences drawn from it, see Kerslake 2008, 
Chapter Four. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Meillassoux is explicit about his aim being, ―that of building a materialism – or a realism – 
able to refute clearly the correlational circle in its simplest form, which is also the form 
which is the most difficult to fight with‖ (Meillassoux in Brassier et. al. 2007: 426). Three key 
points need to be stressed here: the equation of materialism and realism; the opposition of 
both to a critique of representation; and the non-dialectical, but rather mathematical, nature 
of this materialism or realism. Indeed, its temporal bias may have even deeper implications: 
largely aspatial, it depends on a non-dialectical linear teleology. 
 
The return of mathematical ordering, not merely in terms of a way of understanding the 
world, but as a suggestion that this is actually how the world is, is one that should be 
contested. Only a recognition that mathematics appears suspect, and a rejection of some 
lineages in order to pursue others, such as that articulated by Ruddick where she suggests an 
―emergent rather than axiomatic‖ mathematics, can begin to escape this (2008: 9). Dialectical 
thinking, which was so important in the first turn away from quantitative geography, may be 
a viable alternative. While previously this was a turn toward Marxism, this is perhaps 
particularly the case today if this dialectics is reworked in conversation with post-
structuralism. This is not an either/or choice: one could conceivable reject both mathematics 
and dialectics. But if we return to Bergson, and Deleuze‘s gloss, perhaps we can see that 
dialectics, understood in some of the ways outlined in these papers, can help us to grasp the 
world in its becoming, with its complexities, yet without reducing it to the coordinates of a 
reality we are already predisposed to know how to measure. We should not take the limits of 
our grasp of the world as the limits of the world. Dialectics might help us to make sense of 
the world without thinking that nature operates dialectically. 
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The more powerful way of stating this is that dialectics might be one of the ways in which 
we can understand the problems of a world understood as measurable, one that can be 
reduced to the claim that it is fundamentally knowable. This seems to be at least part of the 
challenge of Meillassoux. But are we willing to embrace mathematics as the solution to this 
problem? Like Simonsen (2004), I am concerned about the resurrection of a particular 
geometrical form of argument, following in the wake of Deleuze‘s appropriations of Spinoza 
and Leibniz, and now Badiou. Can dialectics, perhaps reformulated, provide an alternative?  
 
‗Traditional‘ dialectics cannot remain unchanged, and to develop and supplement it is surely 
permissible. It may benefit, today as in the past, from the introduction of other ideas. This is 
one of Lefebvre‘s key insights, and something that is developed in these papers. The 
productive collision between post-structuralism and traditional dialectics, outlined by 
Sheppard and pursued in differing ways through most of the papers here is one way forward. 
Providing that this appropriation is not ‗pick n‘ mix‘ theorizing, of course, and that it 
undertakes the careful and detailed work of reading and analyzing complex thinkers, this 
plurality is one of the more invigorating currents of contemporary geography. Anything less 
than an openness to change would, of course, be profoundly undialectical. 
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